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SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE
CPLR 3102(d) is reserved for unique situations. Although the
court, in its discretion, may order the taking of testimony by deposition
after the trial has begun, disclosure ordinarily will not be unavailable
to the movant who could have secured the information through normal
pretrial proceedings. 45 Hence, the appellate division was certainly
justified in over turning the procedure followed in the lower court.
The framers of the CPLR anticipated that extraordinary situa-
tions might exist wherein justice required the reading of a deposition
into evidence although a witness was available for the trial.46 None-
theless, the importance of presenting the testimony of an expert witness
orally in court must not be underestimated. Slight inconsistencies in
treatises or inadequacies in medical records with respect to time of
treatment or nature of observations, which can appear so dramatic
in the course of the trial, become quite insignificant when a deposi-
tion is read in court. Perhaps, the courts should adopt a rule prohibit-
ing the use of depositions of expert witnesses in circumstances such as
Schricker. An expert who is afraid to appear before a jury, and refuses
to do so, should not be permitted to serve as a witness because of the
unfairness to the opposing party.
CPLR 3126: Action dismissed with prejudice where preclusion order
encompasses entire claim.
CPLR 3126 authorizes the imposition of penalties upon a party47
who refuses to disclose information either willfully4 or in disobedience
of a court order. In addition to the express sanctions, the court is em-
powered to make "any such orders that are just.''49 Undoubtedly,
however, the most severe penalty that can be levied is one that is spe-
cifically enumerated under this section: the rendition of a default
judgment against the recalcitrant defendant 0 or the dismissal with
45 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 3102, commentary 8, at 267 (1970); 3 WK&M 3102.19; see
also Kravetz v. United Artists Corp., 141 N.Y.S.2d 676 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1955). But cf.
Nardelli v. Stain, 13 App. Div. 2d 698, 213 N.Y.S.2d 806 (2d Dep't 1961); Lopez v. Rich, 33
Misc. 2d 102, 224 N.Y.S.2d 314 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1962).
46 3 WK&M 3117.08.
47 CPLR 3126 pertains to a party or a person under the party's control. Sanctions
against a nonparty witness are secured by an application to punish for contempt. 7B
McKINNEY'S CPLR 3126, commentary 3, at 642 (1970).
48 If a party has willfully failed to disclose, a 3126 motion lies, without the necessity
of first securing an order compelling disclosure. See Goldner v. Lendor Structures, Inc.,
29 App. Div. 2d 978, 289 N.Y.S.2d 687 (2d Dep't 1968); Coffey v. Orbachs, Inc., 22 App.
Div. 2d 317, 254 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1st Dep't 1964).
49 See, e.g., Cotteral v. City of New Rochelle, 33 App. Div. 2d 366, 807 N.Y.S.2d 725
(Ist Dep't 1969), discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JoHN's L. Rix. 145, 159 (1970).
50 See, e.g., James v. Powell, 26 App. Div. 2d 525, 270 N.YS.2d 789 (1st Dep't 1966),
rev'd on other grounds, 19 N.Y.2d 249, 225 N.E.2d 741, 279 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1967).
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prejudice of the disobedient plaintiff's cause of action.51 As demon-
strated by In re Porter,52 though dismissal is rare,53 the court will
experience little compunction in so doing when the evasive conduct
goes to the essence of a party's claim.
In Porter an objectant to proceedings in the surrogate's court
was ordered to answer certain questions on August 14 and to appear
in court for examination on August 31. The objectant not only failed
to appear on either occasion, he also neglected to respond to the instant
motion. The court recognized that if it merely precluded the ob-
jectant from adducing any evidence, the estate would be in a position
to move for summary judgment. For, since the scope of disclosure en-
compassed his entire claim, the preclusion order would be equally
broad in its sweep.54 Moreover, the court was convinced that the claim
was totally devoid of merit. Accordingly, the objections were dismissed
with prejudice.
ARTICLE 50-JUDGMENTS GENERALLY
CPLR 5015(a)(1): Busy schedule does not constitute ground for "ex-
cusable default."
Under CPLR 5015 the court's "inherent discretionary power to
vacate its own judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of sub-
stantial justice"5 5 is affirmed statutorily. CPLR 5015(a)(1) prescribes
the manner in which a party may move for vacatur of a judgment or
an order on the ground of "excusable default." Although courts have
been generous in opening default judgments in the past,56 a recent case,
Hoffman v. Biendo,57 illustrates that relief is not automatic. Specifically,
"law office failure" will not be considered "excusable default" within
the purview of this subsection.58
In Hoffman counsel had assured the court that he would be ready
to proceed to trial on a specific date after an adjournment had been
granted because he was not prepared. Nevertheless, he failed to appear
with defendant and efforts to page him proved futile. Defendant sub-
sequently applied for an order vacating the resultant default judg-
51See, e.g., Laverne v. Incorporated Village of Laurel Hollow, 18 N.Y.2d 635, 219
N.E2d 294, 272 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1966).
52 64 Misc. 2d 1016, 316 N.Y.S.2d 504 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
537B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3126, commentary 7, at 646-48 (1970).
54 See id., commentary 8, at 649-50 (1970).
55 Tsm REP. 204; see also 5 WK&M 5015.12.
555 WK&M 5015.04.
57 64 Misc. 2d 499, 314 N.Y.S.2d 759 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
58 Cf. Beermont Corp. v. Yager, 34 App. Div. 2d 589, 308 N.Y.S.2d 109 (8d Dep't 1970),
discussed in The Quarterly Survey, 45 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 145, 162 (1970) (busy schedule
does not constitute justifiable excuse for delay under CPLR 3216).
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